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XSS attacks : number one threat
 …and the trend continues...
Second half of 2007 : 80% of all attacks were XSS 
January 2007 : 70% web applications are vulnerable
[source : http://en.wikipedia.org]
 Simple attacks lucrative targets
<script> alert(„xss‟);</script>
XSS
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 Attacker controlled code can steal sensitive 
information or perform malicious operations.
A typical XSS attack
Claim prize
http://b.com/?name=[evilCode]
Email
Vulnerable 
bank web 
application
Client 
browser
name=[evilCode]
<html>
...
[evilCode]
...
</html>
Response page ...
evilCode executed!
...
Objective
 Automated prevention of XSS attacks : server side
 Robust against subtle attacks
 Efficient
Automated 
Transformation
Vulnerable 
web 
application
Safe 
web 
application
Outline of this talk
 Introduction
 Web application transformation technique
 Robust script identification at server side
 XSS-GUARD
Examples
Evaluation results 
 Related work and summary
HTML page : A web application‟s view
 Page generated by output statements in a control path.
 Web application‟s view : intended regions & others 
Other regions could lead to unintended script code.
Web application
User Input
name= xyz
write( “hi” )
write( name )
write( [code] )
hi
xyz
[code]
HTML 
page
Output 
statements not
influenced by user 
inputs produce 
programmer 
intended 
script code/data
Others may 
produce
unintended script 
code
HTML page : A browser‟s view
 Browser does not differentiate between injected and 
programmer intended scripts. 
 Browser‟s view : a collection of script code & data.
write( “hi” )
write( name )
write( [code] )
hi
[evilCode]
[code]
name= [evilCode]
Browser
data
code
code
Web application
HTML 
page
A complete view
 An effective defense would require both these views!
hi
[evilCode]
[code]
HTML 
page
Web 
application
Browser
data
code
code
intended
other
intended
Web application 
view
Knows intentions
Browser view
Knows scripts
Idea
If a web application knows 
intended scripts
and 
all the scripts (including injected)
for a generated HTML page, it can 
remove unintended scripts.
Question : How to compute intended scripts?
write( [code] )realPage, [code] )
write( name )realPage, name )
write( “hi” )realPage, “hi” )
 Replicate output statements uninfluenced by user 
inputs to create shadow page.
 Other output statements replicated but act on benign 
inputs (as intended).
Computing intended code
Web 
application
name= xyz
Real
HTML 
page
name_c = aaa
write( shadowPage, name_c )
Shadow
HTML 
page
hi
xyz
[code]
hi
aaa
[code]
data
data
code
data
data
code
write( shadowPage, “hi” )
write( shadowPage, [code] )
Computing intended code…cont.
 Real page contains injected script, but shadow retains 
only intended script.
 For a real page, its shadow page has intended scripts.
Web application
name = [xssCode]
Real
HTML 
page
name_c = aaaaaaaa
Shadow
HTML 
page
hi
[xssCode]
[code]
hi
aaaaaaa
[code]
data
code
code
data
data
code
write( realPage, “hi” )
write( shadowPage, name_c )
write( realPage, name )
write( realPage, [code] )
write( shadowPage, “hi” )
write( shadowPage, [code] )
Shadow page captures intended code
 Real HTML page = output statements with user inputs
 Shadow HTML page = mirror above output statements 
with benign user inputs
 Transform web application to create shadow (intended) 
page for each real page
Define “benign input” for each “real input”.
Mirror the “actual input” processing on “benign input”.
Replicate output statements with above processed inputs.
For details on transformation, please refer to
CANDID: Preventing SQL Injection Attacks using 
Dynamic Candidate Evaluations, S. Bandhakavi, P. Bisht, P. 
Madhusudan, V.N. Venkatakrishnan, ACM CCS 2007, 
submitted to ACM TISSEC 2008
Idea Revisited
If a web application knows 
intended scripts
and 
all scripts (including injected)
for a generated HTML page, it can 
remove unintended scripts.
Question : How to compute intended scripts?
- By computing shadow pages.
Question : How can application identify all scripts?
What about filters?
Filters effective first layer...but lack 
context
 Ineffective against subtle cases 
MySpace Samy worm used eval(„inner‟ + „HTML‟) to evade 
“innerHTML” filter.
 Large attack surface 
tags and URI schemes, attributes, event handlers, alternate 
encoding...
 Filters analyze inputs without their context of use.
 Alternate scheme: find scripts in output (HTML page)
Inputs embedded in context of use in HTML page 
write( “<scri”)
write(“pt>”)
<script>
<scri
pt>
<script> filter
OK
OK
Not 
OK
HTML page
How Firefox identifies scripts? 
 Lexical analysis component identifies tokens. 
 HTML tag based processing identifies scripts in:   
External resource download e.g., <script src=...>
Inlined scripts/event handlers e.g., <body onload=...>
URI schemes that can have scripts e.g., javascript/data
hi
xyz
[code]
HTML 
page
Browser
Lexical 
Analysis
HTML Tag 
based 
processing
Code 
identification 
scheme
Code 
Execution 
Module
Leveraging browser‟s code identification 
mechanism
 A browser performs precise identification of scripts.
 Robust
alternate encodings
large attack surface 
 Our approach leverages this at the server side. 
Modifications record all scripts in real HTML page.
hi
xyz
[code]
Real HTML page
contains all 
scripts
Modified 
Lexical 
Analysis
Modified
HTML Tag 
based 
processing
identifies all scripts
[code]
XSS-GUARD : End – to - End
Safe web application
Transformed
web 
application
HTTP 
request
...
aaaaaa
[code]
...
[code]
[code]
real
page
shadow
page
real
page
shadow
page
≈
≈
Removal of injected 
code
...
aaaaaa
[code]
...
[code]
...
[code]
Verified 
real
page
XSS-GUARD : intended scripts
 All intended scripts in real page have equivalent scripts 
in shadow page.
Web application
name = xyz
hi
xyz
[code]
Real
page
hi
[code]
name_c = aaa
aaa
code
code
Shadow
page
≈write( shadowPage, name_c )
write( realPage, “hi” )
write( realPage, name )
write( realPage, [code] )
write( shadowPage, “hi” )
write( shadowPage, [code] )
XSS-GUARD : Attack prevention
 Injected script in real page does not have equivalent 
script in shadow page, and is removed.
Web application
name = <script>...</script>
name_c = aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
hi
<script> </script>
[code]
hi
[code]
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
code
Shadow
page
data
≈
Real
page
write( shadowPage, name_c )
write( realPage, “hi” )
write( realPage, name )
write( realPage, [code] )
write( shadowPage, “hi” )
write( shadowPage, [code] )
XSS-GUARD : Subtle attack case 
 Any unintended addition to existing scripts is 
successfully prevented.
web application
name = aa;evil(…);
name_c = aaaaaaaaaa
<script> x = aa; 
evil(...);</script>
Real
page
Shadow
page
code
≈
code
<script> x = 
aaaaaaaa</script>
write( shadowPage, name_c )
write( realPage, “<script>x = ” )
write( realPage, name )
write( realPage, “</script>” )
write( shadowPage, “<script>x=” )
write( shadowPage, “</script>” )
Effectiveness Evaluation
 Against real world exploits
 Defended 32 applicable exploits out of  92 : R. Hansen 
XSS cheatsheet. 
 False negatives : non-Firefox attacks 
Current implementation can be extended
initial experiments : Defended 35 / 56 non-Firefox attacks
CVE-2007-5120/5121 JSPWiki defended
CVE-2007-2450 Tomcat HTML Manager defended
CVE-2007-3386 Tomcat Host Manager defended
CVE-2007-3383/3384/2449
CVE-2006-7196
Tomcat Example Web 
Applications
defended
Performance Evaluation
 Performance overhead (response time)
 Parse tree comparison is rarely done : in presence of 
attacks, or scripts embedding user inputs.
 These numbers indicate worst case performance –
Negligible network latency in experiments (LAN setup)
Can be further improved by limiting the transformation to only 
relevant statements.
Exploits from CVE 5 – 24 %
Varied response sizes
(1KB – 75KB)
3 – 14 %
Parse tree comparison of 
scripts (1 – 5)
37 – 42 %
Some Related Work
 Vulnerability analysis: find vulnerable source-sink pairs e.g.,  
saner: Livshits et al. Usenix 2005, Pixy N. Jovanovic et al. S&P2006, Y. 
Xie et al. Usenix 2006, D. Balzarotti et al. CCS 2007...
 Useful but limited to detection
 Server side solutions: filter based or track taint & disallow 
at sink : W. Xu et al. Usenix 2006, …
 Centralized defense but do not know all scripts
 Client side solutions: Firewall like mechanisms to prevent 
malicious actions at client 
 Noxes E. Kirda, et al. SAC 2006, P. Vogt et al. NDSS 2007
 User controlled protection but do not know intended scripts
 Client-Server collaborative solutions: Clients enforce 
application specified policies
 BEEP T. Jim, et al. WWW 2007, Tahoma R. Cox et al. S&P 2006, 
Browsershield C. Reis et al. OSDI 2006
 Can determine intended and all scripts but deployment issues
Contributions and future work
 A robust server side solution to prevent XSS attacks.
 A mechanism to compute programmer intended code, 
useful in defending other code injection attacks. 
 Leveraged browser‟s mechanisms at server side. 
Thanks for your attention! 
Questions? 
Backup Slides
Taint vs Candidate evaluations
 Taint tracking captures “trust” notion.
 Candidate computation captures “intended 
structure”.
 We found taint tracking and limiting tainted 
constructs in parse trees, a very powerful 
idea. There are no differences in 
effectiveness but there are subtle 
differences –
 X = taintedX – taintedX + 100.5;
X will be treated as tainted : false positive?
 X_c = taintedX_c – taintedX_c + 100.5; 
X_c will contain equivalent structure to X.
Miscellaneous examples
 Non-Firefox construct based false negative
<IMG SRC='vbscript:msgbox("XSS")'>
Firefox does not understand vbscript URIs.
 Firefox quirk based exploit 
<script/xss src=“”> </script>
Changes done to handle non-Firefox 
quirks
 Others (3)
 Attacks based on src attributes (2)
<XML SRC="xsstest.xml" ID=I></XML> <SPAN 
DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C 
DATAFORMATAS=HTML></SPAN> 
<SCRIPT a=`>` 
SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"></SCRIPT>
 Javascript / data URI scheme based exploits (30)
<img src=“javascript:alert(„XSS‟)”>Is ignored in Firefox, 
but valid in other browsers. 
We forced all the attributes to be parsed irrespective of 
Firefox applicability. 
Candidate Transformation
Performance numbers (detailed)
Related work
 Filters : don‟t have adequate context
 Output encoding : may forbid all HTML
 Taint : Effective, focuses on taintedness, rather than 
semantics
 Server side solutions : 
 Client side solutions : Firewall like behavior, may disallow 
legitimate scripts, or allow attacks on trusted servers.
 Server-client side solutions
Real page and shadow page comparison 
with offsets
False positive in subtle case
Example with existing filters – prevent 
attack
